The Base token should give holders voting power over Coinbase itself

Base, the Ethereum-based layer-2 network incubated by Coinbase, has reportedly begun to explore launching a native token, triggering a wave of speculation across the industry. X product lead Nikita Bier recently shared a screenshot of X’s new Smart Cashtags feature listing a hypothetical “Base” token with a $373 billion market capitalization and a $130 price per token. JPMorgan analysts recently estimated that such a token could unlock up to $34 billion in value, framing Base as one of Coinbase’s strongest new monetization levers. While no specific timeline has been communicated by the team, the launch between Q2-Q4 2026 is expected.

Yet most current discussions overlook a critical point: if Base is going to issue a token, it must break from the tired model of governance theater and yield-farm mechanics that have defined most L2 launches. A Base token that behaves like another speculative rewards mechanism will waste one of the most unique opportunities in the crypto market.

One structure that would justify a Base token — economically, politically and strategically — is one that directly connects the token to real voting power over Coinbase itself. The popular Rainbow wallet has set a precedent for this, creating a new class of stock (Class F) for the Rainbow Studios Inc. entity (an Oregon-based corporation), comprising 20% of the company’s equity. This stock will be held by the Rainbow Foundation, which in turn represents the tokenholders. It represents one of the first known examples of a crypto project legally tying tokenholders to equity exposure. For Coinbase in practice, that would mean setting up something similar: creating a foundation in a legally crypto-friendly environment (e.g., the Cayman Islands or Switzerland) to govern the Base DAO, raising capital publicly and privately, and using that capital to acquire up to 50% of COIN shares. Base holders would then be empowered to exercise shareholder voting rights through the DAO, effectively turning Base into the first token that securitizes the success of a major U.S. public company without violating securities law. Some readers will argue that this design is too radical or too legally ambitious, but the shifted political environment — from the pro-innovation and crypto stance of U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration to Coinbase’s strengthened regulatory position — makes this precisely the moment to attempt it.

Base has already become one of the most active layer-2 networks, surpassing 10 million daily transactions and more than $5.1 billion in TVL, according to data from DeFiLama. At the same time, rollups like Ink, incubated by Coinbase’s competitor crypto exchange Kraken, have announced their own utility tokens, placing competitive pressure on Base to formalize its tokenomics. Coinbase can seize the unique opportunity to launch a token that is differentiated from competitors. A governance-plus-cash-flow model is not sufficient; dozens of L2s already pretend to be “community-owned” with tokens that confer nominal voting rights but little meaningful control over strategic decisions, capital allocation, or the entities that ultimately operate the network. What Coinbase, as a publicly traded company, can uniquely do and what no other current layer-2 can replicate (e.g. Kraken is not publicly traded) is bind onchain governance with off-chain corporate power. At first glance, this may appear less like decentralization and more like deeper coupling between Base and Coinbase. But this framing misunderstands what is being decentralized. The objective is not to further separate infrastructure or governance silos, but to decentralize ownership and influence. By allowing a globally distributed base of token holders, many of whom would otherwise have no access to U.S. equity markets, to collectively acquire and exercise shareholder rights, Base would radically broaden and decentralize Coinbase’s shareholder base rather than concentrate it. In that sense, this model decentralizes power not by weakening the connection between Base and Coinbase, but by distributing control over that connection across a transparent, onchain governance system.

Under this hypothetical design, the Base Foundation would conduct a raise targeting roughly $35 billion (representing 50% of COIN’s market capitalization), using platforms like recently-acquired Echo, its own token sale platform used for the Monad token sale, merit-based Legion backed by Coinbase Ventures and institutional placement allowing a broad and diversified token holder base, increasing the token's success. The funds would be used to purchase half of COIN’s public float, converting BASE into a tokenized proxy for corporate ownership. This would not only give BASE a hard economic floor but also align its value with Coinbase’s long-term performance. A soft peg could emerge, for example, 100 BASE = 1 COIN, supported by market incentives and buyback mechanisms. The model resembles a decentralized holding company: a DAO whose members wield real influence within one of the most systemically important crypto institutions.

Importantly, the relationship would not be reciprocal. While Base token holders would gain economic exposure and shareholder voting power through collectively owned Coinbase shares, existing Coinbase equity holders would not automatically receive Base tokens or onchain governance rights. Any benefit to equity holders would be indirect: a more engaged, long-term aligned ownership base and a Base ecosystem structurally incentivized to grow Coinbase’s core business. This one-way linkage avoids circular incentives while preserving Coinbase’s corporate and regulatory clarity.

This could also prevent community backlashes as we have seen recently at blue-chip DeFi project Aave, where a fierce debate erupted between the DAO and the Aave Labs entity about who captures the value and owns the project, highlighting the conflict that can occur when incentives are not aligned. Other examples of misalignment include acquisitions such as Interop Labs, the initial developer of Axelar Network, Vertex Protocol, or Padre, where token holders had little to no compensation. This current structure of the crypto market creates a "dual-class" system where equity investors capture the upside from M&A events, while token holders absorb the downside risk.

Market implications would be truly fascinating. If BASE becomes economically tied to COIN, the token would trade not as a memeified L2 coin, but as a liquid, globally-accessible representation of equity-like value. A token that explicitly represents economic exposure to a well-regulated, publicly audited U.S. company introduces a new asset class: onchain equity reflections — not tokenized equity issued by a company, but economic exposure created when a decentralized governance body acquires and governs real-world shares on the open market.

It is important to distinguish this model from the wave of tokenized equity experiments that dominated crypto discussions last year. Those models typically involved companies issuing tokens that directly represented shares or revenue claims, placing them firmly within securities issuance frameworks. By contrast, an onchain equity reflection does not involve corporate issuance at all: the token derives its value from collective governance over assets acquired independently in public markets. If tokenized equity puts shares onchain, onchain equity reflections put shareholder power onchain.

Such a system would also force other crypto projects to rethink their own models. Base is already part of the Optimism Superchain, which frames L2s as sovereign subnets with shared infrastructure. If Base raised enough capital to accumulate major ownership in Coinbase, it would establish a precedent for network-level governance with real-world assets rather than symbolic votes. This would pull L2 competition away from ecosystem grants and short-lived incentives toward direct value capture, a shift the industry has been slow to embrace.

Critics will argue that purchasing 50% of COIN introduces unacceptable regulatory risk or amounts to a de facto tokenized security. Yet the Base DAO would not be issuing claims on future revenue; it would be using independently raised funds to buy publicly available shares, just like any other institutional or activist investor. The token would not need to hard-code dividends or earnings claims. Instead, its value would derive from meaningful economic exposure to Coinbase, collective shareholder voting power, and the ability through DAO governance to introduce value-capture mechanisms such as staking-based participation, long-term lockups, buybacks, or dividend-like distributions over time, building on governance models already familiar to Base users through protocols like Curve and Aerodrome.

Politically, this move would strengthen Coinbase’s position rather than weaken it. A decentralized body holding half its shares would create an unprecedented alignment between Coinbase’s corporate mission and the broader crypto community. Instead of regulatory hostility toward exchange-native tokens (a common theme in past cycles), regulators could be forced to consider a more nuanced model: a token whose influence is mediated through democratic governance rather than corporate issuance.

The strategic upside for Coinbase is equally significant. The obvious objection is why Coinbase would ever tolerate a DAO of token holders exercising influence over its own governance. Why invite a hyper-engaged, globally distributed constituency when traditional public shareholders are largely passive? The answer is that this structure does not require Coinbase to relinquish control in any meaningful sense. The Base DAO would acquire voting power the same way any activist investor does: by purchasing shares on the open market. Coinbase already operates within a framework where hedge funds, index providers, and institutional allocators can quietly accumulate influence without the company’s consent. A Base DAO would simply formalize a new class of shareholder — one that is radically more transparent, structurally long-term, and economically aligned with crypto’s growth rather than quarterly earnings alone.

Nor is an engaged shareholder base inherently a liability. In public markets, apathy is often a weakness, not a feature. Activist shareholders are frequently welcomed when they bring durable capital, long-term conviction, and strategic coherence. A Base DAO would be economically tied to Coinbase’s success and structurally incentivized to expand onchain activity, grow the Base ecosystem, and defend Coinbase’s legitimacy as crypto’s core infrastructure provider. Its influence would resemble that of a permanent anchor shareholder rather than a hostile or fragmented crowd.

Crucially, Coinbase retains full optionality. Corporate law, board composition, voting thresholds, and governance covenants allow public companies to engage with large shareholders without surrendering operational control. The DAO’s role would be bounded — focused on strategic oversight rather than day-to-day management. In that sense, this is not about “handing the keys to a DAO,” but about upgrading Coinbase’s shareholder base from passive capital to a globally distributed constituency whose incentives mirror the company’s long-term success.

As decentralized exchanges continue to grow, now representing roughly 25% of all spot trading, the company must extend its influence beyond its centralized exchange business. Some investors have long argued that Coinbase does not fully capture the value it enables across the crypto ecosystem. A Base token tied to COIN transforms that dynamic. Instead of indirect monetization through developer activity or protocol fees, Coinbase would gain a fully aligned, globally distributed governance base that has an economic incentive to expand usage of the Base network.

In short, the Base token should not mimic the design patterns of the past. It should become the first token that merges decentralized governance with meaningful corporate ownership, creating a bridge between public-company accountability and onchain community control. Anything less would squander a major chance the industry has to prove that tokens can represent more than speculative memeified assets — they can represent true ownership and utility.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely the authors' own and do not reflect the views of their employer, 21Shares, or any affiliated organizations.